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RECENT CASE
JUVENILE LAW-JURY RECOMMENDATION UNDER
PENAL CODE SECTION 264 DOES NOT PRECLUDE
TRIAL COURT FROM COMMITTING DEFENDANT TO
THE YOUTH AUTHORITY-People v. Mackey, 46 Cal. App.
3d 755, 120 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1975).
David Earl Mackey was accused of committing unlawful sex-
ual intercourse with a female under the age of eighteen in viola-
tion of Penal Code section 261.5.1 At the time of the offense,
the defendant was 17 years of age, and the prosecuting witness
was 14 years of age. Penal Code section 2642 provides in part:
Unlawful sexual intercourse, as defined in Section 261.5, is
punishable either by imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than one year or in the state prison for not more than
50 years, and in such case the jury shall recommend by their
verdict whether the punishment shall be by imprisonment in
the county jail or in the state prison . .. .3
The jury found the defendant guilty and recommended that he
be punished by confinement in the county jail.4 The superior
court disregarded the jury's recommendation and, applying Wel-
fare and Institutions Code section 1731.5,5 committed the defend-
ant to the Youth Authority.
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1975) provides:
Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished
with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under
the age of 18 years.
2. CAL. PEN. CODE § 264 (West Supp. 1975).
3. Id. § 264.
4. People v. Mackey, 46 Cal. App. 3d 755, 757, 120 Cal. Rptr. 157, 158
(1975).
5. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1731.5 (West 1972) provides in relevant
part:
[A] court may commit to the authority any person convicted of a public
offense who comes within subdivision (a), (b), and (c), or subdivisions
(a), (b), and (d) below;
(a) Is found to be less than 21 years of age at the time of appre-
hension.
(b) Is not sentenced to death, imprisonment for 90 days or less, or
the payment of a fine, or after having been directed to pay a fine,
defaults in the payment thereof, and is subject to imprisonment for
more than 90 days under the judgment.
(c) Is not granted probation.
(d) Was granted probation and probation is revoked and ter-
minated.
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On appeal from the order, the defendant contended that in
committing him to the Youth Authority rather than following thejury's recommendation, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order.,
Unlawful sexual intercourse is an alternative sentence of-fense: Penal Code section 264 provides for a jury recommenda-
tion of incarceration either in state prison or in the county jail.7In determining whether the trial court is bound by the jury's rec-
ommendation, the Mackey court discussed and ultimately dis-tinguished a line of cases which held that a trial court is without ju-
risdiction to impose a prison sentence when the jury recommends
confinement in the county jail.
In People v. Rombaud, the court of appeal vacated defend-
ant's prison sentence and held that the trial court was requiredto sentence the defendant to jail, in accord with the jury verdict.
A similar case, In re Ferguson,9 held that
the recommendation of the jury that the defendant shall bepunished by imprisonment in the county jail is binding upon
the court, and it may not, in disregard thereof, impose a sen-
tence of imprisonment in the state prison. 10
6. The defendant also claimed a denial of equal protection of the law, inthat the statute under which he was convicted makes an unconstitutional classifica-tion of minor females to the exclusion of minor males. Section 261.5 prohibitssexual intercourse with a female under the age of 18; the statute does not bar sexualactivity with a minor male. CAL. PEN. CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1975). Thecourt dismissed this argument very briefly, apparently finding no violation of ei-ther the United States or the California Constitution. The United States SupremeCourt, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), held that legislative classificationsby sex are not violative of equal protection guarantees, so long as the classificationis related to the objective of the statute and is not arbitrary:[T]his court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendmentdoes not deny to the states the power to treat different classes of per-sons in different ways. [It] does, however, deny to states the power tolegislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by astatute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated tothe objective of that statute. A classification "must be reasonable, notarbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fairand substantial relation to the object of the legislation.
404 U.S. at 75-76 (citations omitted).
The California Supreme Court has held that sex is a suspect class for pur-poses of the equal protection clause of the California Constitution. Sail'er Inn,Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). However,the court apparently had no difficulty determining the existence of a compelling
state interest in section 261.5.7. CAL. PEN. CODE § 264 (West Supp. 1975) prescribes the punishment for
violation of section 261.5:
Unlawful sexual intercourse, as defined in Section 261.5, is punishable
either by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one yearor in the state prison for not more than 50 years, and in such case thejury shall recommend by their verdict whether punishment shall be byimprisonment in the county jail or in the state prison.8. 78 Cal. App. 685, 248 P. 954 (1926).9. 233 Cal. App. 2d 79, 43 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1965).
10. Id. at 81, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
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Again, in People v. Brown,1 the trial court imposed a sentence
of imprisonment in the state prison, notwithstanding the jury's rec-
ommendation of confinement in the county jail. The Attorney
General conceded that "the sentence was erroneous under a long-
standing rule that when the jury recommends county jail, the trial
court may not impose a state prison sentence."'
2
Another case, People v. Pantages," presented a slightly dif-
ferent situation. The trial judge failed to instruct the jury to make
the sentencing recommendation as required by section 264.'4 The
California Supreme Court considered whether the recommenda-
tion is in fact a part of the verdict of the jury and as such is binding
upon the trial court. It concluded that the recommendation by
the jury as to the place where the defendant shall be imprisoned
"is an essential, inseparable part of the verdict and as such is con-
clusive and binding upon the trial court as far as pronouncement
by it of the ensuing judgment is concerned,"' 5 and remanded the
case for a new trial.
The gist of these cases is simply stated in Brown: "When
the jury recommends county jail, the trial court may not impose
a state prison sentence."' 6 The rationale appears to be that when
a statute provides for alternative punishments, as does section 264,
the recommendation by the jury as to the place and length of con-
finement is a statement of its opinion as to the seriousness of the
offense, and must be recognized as such by the court in sentencing
the defendant. 7
The Mackey court conceded that the Rombaud line of cases
clearly establishes that a court may not treat a defendant with
more severity than the jury recommends; it concluded, however,
that the trial court, in its discretion "may treat a defendant with
more leniency than the jury recommends."' 8  The jury's recom-
mendation of confinement in a county jail "fixed" Mackey's of-
fense as a misdemeanor.' 9 In addition, Penal Code section 17(b)
(2) provides that where an offense is alternatively punishable as
11. 35 Cal. App. 3d 317, 110 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1973).
12. Id. at 328, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
13. 212 Cal. 237, 297 P. 890 (1931).
14. CAL. PEN. CODE § 264 (West Supp. 1975). See note 7 supra.
15. 212 Cal. at 270, 297 P. at 904.
16. People v. Brown, 35 Cal. App. 3d 317, 328, 110 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861
(1973).
17. People v. Pantages, 212 Cal. 237, 297 P. 890 (1931); People v. Brown,
35 Cal. App. 3d 317, 110 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1973); In re Ferguson, 233 Cal. App. 2d
79, 43 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1965); People v. Rombaud, 78 Cal. App. 685, 248 P. 954
(1926).
18. People v. Mackey, 46 Cal. App. 3d 755, 758, 120 Cal. Rptr. 157, 158
(1975) (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 759, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
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a felony or a misdemeanor, commitment of the offender to theCalifornia Youth Authority shall be considered misdemeanor dis-position.2" Thus the judge and jury concurred in their evaluation
of the seriousness of the offense. The appellate court reasoned
that since the judge may properly "recommend the placing of adefendant in an honor camp rather than in the county jail,"'" the
trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction in committing Mackey
to the Youth Authority. 22
In deciding this issue the court of appeal considered the in-
terrelationship of Penal Code sections 261.5 and 264, and the
commitment power granted in the Youth Authority Act.23  De-
fendant Mackey contended that once the jury had made its rec-
ommendation, the court was without discretion as to the sentence.Therefore, Mackey reasoned, section 264, by providing for a bind-ing jury recommendation, created an exception to the general
power of juvenile commitment given the court by the Youth Au-thority Act. The court rejected this argument, concluding that
the effect of the jury recommendation was merely to fix the de-gree of the crime as a misdemeanor, precluding a state prison sen-
tence. It neither fixed the length of the sentence nor prevented
the court from exercising its discretion as to the appropriate mis-demeanor disposition. The critical point is that the crime of un-lawful sexual intercourse is punishable under section 264 either
as a felony or a misdemeanor; the court of appeal determined thatit is irrelevant whether the judge or the jury makes that determi-
nation. Once the degree of the crime is fixed, the court may com-
mit to the Youth Authority any defendant who qualifies under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5.24
In distinguishing the Rombaud line of cases from the instant
case, the court clearly viewed commitment to the Youth Authority
as a more lenient sentence than the alternative of confinement
in a county jail for not more than one year.25  It saw the Youth
20. CAL. PEN. CODE § 17(b)(2) (West 1970). See also 4 OP. ATr'Y GEN.
25 (1944):
[A] commitment to the Youth Authority is a judgment imposing apenalty other than imprisonment in the state prison. In our opinionthe conviction is therefore to be considered as a misdemeanor.21. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 758, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
22. id. at 759, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 159.23. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1700 et seq. (West 1972). The commitment
provisions are set forth in note 5 supra.
24. See note 5 supra.
25. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 758, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 158. The court stated:[W]e reject the concept that the judge may not recommend the placingof a defendant in an honor camp rather than in the county jail.Although the court may treat a defendant with more leniency thanthe jury recommends, the court may not treat a defendant with more
severity than the jury recommends.
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Authority as the equivalent of an "honor camp,"2 stating that
"while the period of time to be spent under the jurisdiction of the
Authority might be longer than a year, a much earlier parole is
also a possibility."27 The court of appeals' strong reliance on this
leniency argument may be illusory; a juvenile committed to the
Youth Authority may actually receive harsher treatment than the
Mackey jury recommended. Had the trial court followed the
jury's recommendation, Mackey would have been confined in the
county jail for not more than one year.28  Under Welfare and In-
stitutions Code section 1765 (a), the Youth Authority may
keep under continued study a person in its control and shall
retain him . . . under supervision and control so long as in
its judgment such control is necessary for the protection of
the public. 29
Section 1770 provides for the discharge of a person convicted of
a misdemeanor "upon the expiration of a two-year period of con-
trol or when the person reaches his 23rd birthday, whichever oc-
curs later."'  While it is true that Mackey could have received
an almost immediate discharge, it is conceivable that he could
have been confined for as long as six years by the Youth Author-
ity. In addition, the place of confinement is left to the discretion
of the Youth Authority. In People v. Zaccaria,31 it was found
that
under the Youth Authority Act, and under Section 1766 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code, the commitment vests in
the Authority a power over the person committed so broad
that it ranges from permission of liberty under supervision to
confinement in the state prison. There may be such con-
finement even though the offense is a misdemeanor, which
would not have been punishable, in the court's discretion by
imprisonment in the state prison.
3 2
Clearly, commitment to the Youth Authority will not always
result in the placing of the defendant in an "honor camp." The
court of appeal may have left its decision open to a future chal-
lenge on the grounds that commitment to the Youth Authority
could be, in actual effect, a harsher sentence than that recom-
mended by the jury, and thus in conflict with the settled principle
that "a court may not treat a defendant with more severity than
26. Id. at 758, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 158 (1975).
27. Id. at 759, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
28. CAL. PEN. CODE § 264 (West Supp. 1975). See note 7 supra.
29. CAL. WFt. & IN ST. CODE § 1765(a) (West 1972) (emphasis added).
30. Id. § 1770 (emphasis added).
31. 216 Cal. App. 2d 787, 31 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1963).
32. Id. at 790, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 385,
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the jury recommends." 8
The court also based its decision on legislative intent and pur-
pose, which is perhaps a stronger argument for affirmation of the
trial court's commitment. Section 1700 states that the purpose
of the Youth Authority Act is to
protect society more effectively by substituting for retributive
punishment methods of training and treatment directed toward
the correction and rehabilitation of young persons found guilty
of public offenses. To this end it is the intent of the Legis-
lature that the chapter be liberally interpreted in conformity
with its declared purpose.34
Several courts have held that in every criminal case involving juv-
eniles eligible for Youth Authority commitment, the court should,
on its own motion if necessary, consider whether the defendant
could benefit from referral to the Youth Authority. 5 In view of
the legislative intent, these decisions indicate not only that a trialjudge is within his jurisdiction in making a commitment to the
Youth Authority, but that it would be an abuse of discretion not
to consider the Youth Authority as an alternative to a jail term.
It was held in Wetteland v. Superior Court that the power
of the court to commit a defendant to the Youth Authority "can
only be exercised at the time of the judgment of conviction and
imposition of the sentence."36  Under Penal Code section 264,
the jury can recommend imprisonment either in the county jail
or state prison, while only the court has the option to comit a de-
fendant to the Youth Authority." It is highly unlikely that by
providing for a jury recommendation but withholding from thejury the power to recommend Youth Authority commitment, the
legislature meant completely to exclude minors guilty of this crime
from consideration for commitment to the Youth Authority.
The proper sequence of conviction, sentencing and commit-
ment is detailed by the California Supreme Court in Ex parte
Ralph: s
[A] proper interpretation of the pertinent statutory provisions
contemplates that sentence be pronounced prior to tentative
commitment of a defendant to the Youth Authority; that
should the defendant be rejected by the Youth Authority such
33. People v. Mackey, 46 Cal. App. 3d 755, 758, 120 Cal. Rptr. 157, 158
(1975).
34. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1700 (West 1972) (Youth Authority Act).
35. See, e.g., People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr.
411 (1970); People v. Sparks, 262 Cal. App. 2d 597, 68 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1968).
36. 251 Cal. App. 2d 607, 610, 59 Cal. Rptr. 605, 606 (1967).
37. See note 5 supra.
38. 27 Cal. 2d 866, 168 P.2d 1 (1946).
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sentence be executed as originally pronounced, and that pro-
nouncement of a new sentence is unnecessary 39
Applying this to Mackey, the trial judge was within his jurisdiction
in committing the defendant to the Youth Authority. If Mackey
is rejected by the Authority, then it appears likely that the jury's
recommendation of confinement in county jail would take effect.
The intent of the legislature will have been satisfied by the court's
consideration and referral to the Youth Authority.
Unfortunately, Mackey's problem remains unsolved. It is
clear from the Youth Authority Act that the legislature views com-
mitment to the Authority as a privilege, available only to eligible
persons. The Act offers no option to a defendant who would pre-
fer confinement in the county jail, as Mackey obviously would.
It appears, however, that so long as a judge exercises his discretion
within the limits set forth in Mackey-that is, the punishment
imposed is consistent with the jury's recommendation of misde-
meanor treatment-a defendant has no basis for complaint.
Peggy L. Springgay
39. Id. at 871, 168 P.2d at 4.
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